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We compare two institutions head on, a family compact – a parent makes a transfer to her
parent in anticipation of a possible future gift from her children – with a pay-as-you-go, social
security system in a lifecycle model with endogenous fertility wherein children are valued both
as consumption and investment goods. Our focus is strictly on the pension dimension of these
competing institutions. We show that an optimally-chosen family compact and a social security
system cannot co-exist; indeed, the former may be preferred. A strong-enough negative shock
to middle-age incomes destroys family compacts. While such a setting might appear ideal
for the introduction of a social security system – as the experience of Europe, circa 1880s,
would suggest – this turns out not to be the case: if incomes are too depressed to allow family
compacts to flourish, they are also too low to permit introduction of an optimal social security
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“I’ve always said, and I still think we have to admit, that no matter how much
fine reasoning there was about the old-age insurance system and the unemployment
insurance prospects—no matter how many people were studying it, or how many com-
mittees had ideas on the subject, or how many college professors had written theses on
the subject—and there were an awful lot of them—the real roots of the Social Security
Act were in the Great Depression of 1929. Nothing else would have bumped the Amer-
ican people into a social security system except something so shocking, so terrifying,
as that depression.” (Frances Perkins, U.S. Secretary of Labor, 1962).
1 Introduction
For centuries, before the advent of compulsory, tax-funded social security, financial sustenance of
the elderly relied on two sources: their own savings and/or family support. The latter was facilitated
by working-age children under an implicit family compact – each young generation pledged to
support their parents, just as their parents had supported their grandparents in the past. Within
family lines, these compacts worked for many generations and helped prevent the immiserization of
large segments of the elderly population. By early 1900s, industrialization had become widespread
in Europe; with it, business cycles increased in frequency, ferocity, and length. Economy-wide
unemployment and long episodes of depressed wages became routine. These eroded the by-now
meager savings of many elderly and often precipitated the destruction of the aforementioned family
compacts.
In the late 19th century, northern Europe attempted to confront the growing problem of eco-
nomic deprivation and old-age dependency by developing a radically new social ideology – an
ideology that challenged a three-century old Poor Law system1 and instead, entrusted government
with responsibility for the aging members of society. Following a long period of economic de-
pression in the middle of the second half of the century, Bismarck’s Germany ushered in landmark
1
"The English Poor Law of 1601 was the first systematic codification of English ideas about the responsibility of the
state to provide for the welfare of its citizens. It provided for taxation to fund relief activities; it distinguished between
the "deserving" and the "undeserving" poor; relief was local and community controlled; and almshouses were eventually
established to house those on relief. The law was at once both generous and harsh. Generous in that it acknowledged
the government’s duty to provide for the welfare of the poor, but harsh in that it viewed the poor as highly undesirable
characters and treated them accordingly." http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html
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socio-economic reforms ensuring state protection for workers in the areas of health (1883) and old
age (1891).2 The social insurance system that emerged, quickly spread to the rest of Europe. Den-
mark, Norway and England were among the early adopters; eventually by 1930 or so, it had spread
to America.
This paper formalizes some of these ideas within a stylized model of intergenerational transfers
inspired by Cigno (2006a,b). A key feature of the Cigno framework we adopt is the absence of
intergenerational altruism as motivation for intergenerational solidarity. We study a simple, three-
period overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility in which the decision makers are
middle-aged agents who value children both as consumption and investment goods. The latter
role arises because children provide the means of a family pension system, a family compact, in
which the parent, when young, passes along a transfer to her parent in anticipation of receiving
a possible transfer from each of her children in the future. We derive, in a stationary setting, the
optimal family compact, one that is sub-game perfect because it dominates the outside option of
generational autarky.
As a competitor, we introduce a simple, pay-as-you-go pension system or social security
(henceforth “SS”), one that taxes the income of the middle-aged and uses the proceeds to make
lump-sum transfers to the old. Our focus here is strictly on the pension role of a social security
plan. We show that a benevolent government has no welfare justification for introducing SS in a
world with actively-thriving family compacts; i.e., both a private family compact and a public SS
system cannot co-exist. Put differently, a public SS system cannot improve upon the lives of people
under optimally-chosen private family compacts. The problem lies in the fact that private agents
view the public tax-transfer scheme as lump sum; they do not internalize the budgetary implications
2In Bismarck’s own words: "The workers’ real complaint results from the insecurity of their livelihood; they cannot
be certain that they will always be employed; they cannot be certain that they will always enjoy good health and they
know that one day they will be old and unable to work . . . and society does not really recognize any obligation towards
them apart from the common Poor Law provisions, however loyally and industrially any particular worker may have
worked in the past. . . .These classes must through direct and noticeable advantages bestowed upon them by legislation
be brought to look upon the State as not merely an institution invented for the protection of the more well-to-do classes
of society, but one that also serves their interests and needs by securing them direct and tangible advantages through
legislative measures . ." Also see Atchley (1982).
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of their fertility decision (which the government takes as given) meaning they fail to understand
the connection between the pension they are promised and the number of kids they have.3 Since
agents ignore this budgetary margin, the government’s ability to influence agents’ welfare via its
tax-transfer policies is hampered.
We go on to show that family compacts may self-destruct if the income of the middle-aged
takes a big, permanent hit. That is, a sufficient condition for family compacts to break down (and
be replaced by generational autarky) is a large-enough, negative shock to middle-age incomes.
Common intuition suggests such a setting is ripe for the introduction of SS, as indicated by the
aforediscussed experience of Europe, circa 1880s.4 Interestingly, this turns out not to be the case.
We show, and this is our flagship result, that if incomes are too depressed to allow family compacts
to thrive, they are also too low to permit introduction of an optimal SS system.
Does this mean SS systems are redundant? Consider a thought experiment in which family
compacts could flourish but are disallowed, say by law, resulting in a situation of involuntary
generational autarky. In that setting, stationary welfare would be higher if a SS system of the
type we have discussed is introduced. However, if family compacts are allowed to exist and if
indeed they flourish, there is no point introducing SS as a competitor. And if family compacts
don’t exist on their own, then in those settings, there is again no benefit to introducing a SS system.
It bears emphasis here that our work only suggests SS systems are redundant because they serve no
efficiency-enhancing, pension role over and beyond the family compacts. In other words, it is our
contention that the justification for introducing SS, in a world with robust family compacts, must
lie outside of its pension role.5
3If private agents did internalize the budgetary implications of the public scheme, their fertility decision and the
accompanying pension would exactly match what obtains under the compact.
4See Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) for data on year-of-introduction for voluntary and compulsory pension insurance
in European countries.
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"So, also, security was attained in the earlier days through the interdependence of members of families upon each
other and of the families within a small community upon each other. The complexities of great communities and of orga-
nized industry make less real these simple means of security. Therefore, we are compelled to employ the active interest
of the Nation as a whole through government in order to encourage a greater security for each individual who composes
it." FDR’s "Message To Congress Reviewing The Broad Objectives And Accomplishments Of The Administration",
JUNE 8, 1934. http://www.ssa.gov/history/fdrstmts.html#message1
4
Private family compacts and public SS systems, stripped of all adornments, are vehicles of
intergenerational transfers, one via the family line and one intermediated by the government. And
yet, the entire literature on SS systems and their raison d’être – surveyed, for example, in Mulligan
and Sala-i-Martin (2004) – focuses on their efficiency and redistributive properties in isolation,
but never in a direct, head-on comparison with private family compacts. Therein, lies the value
added of our work. Our work does not attempt to add to the, by now, vast literature exploring the
connections between SS, fertility and development. Much of that literature focuses on explaining
why SS blunts parental incentives to have children, a feature present in our model but not our
primary concern.6 Our work, naturally, borrows from the literature on within-family transfers
unmotivated by altruism, emanating from Cigno (1993), and enhanced in Rosati (1996), and Cigno
(2006a,b).7
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model environment, population structure,
the behavior of economic agents and the stationary private family compacts. In Section 3, we
characterize the public social security system and compare it to the private family compact. The
appendix contains the fine print of the family compacts as well as a fully worked-out example with
logarithmic utility.
6Nishimura and Zhang (1992), Ehrlich and Lui (1998) and Zhang and Zhang (1995) contend that public social
security systems distort fertility and explore this idea in models with altruistic agents. The same conclusion is reached
by Ehrlich and Kim (2005). Boldrin, De Nardi, and Jones (2005) demonstrate the effect of old-age pensions in fertility
in two types of calibrated models. In a model based on Boldrin and Jones (2002) they show that the effect is quite large,
but in an altruistic model based on Barro and Becker (1989) it is actually very small.
7Our paper is also related to the influential paper by Zhang and Zhang (1998) wherein children are investment goods
and transfer an endogenously-determined fraction of their income to their old parents. In their setup, social security is
not welfare neutral; it increases economic growth and welfare by reducing fertility. Hence, social security is a more
efficient means of consumption smoothing over the life cycle than are children. They, however, do not study optimal
family compacts in the tradition of Cigno (1993); nor is the head-on comparison of both institutions their concern. In
a recent paper, Galasso and Profeta (2010) analyze the link between the structure of family – whether characterized
by weak or strong family ties – and the emergence of pension systems. In their “new regime”, one characterized by
industrialization, urbanization and nuclear families, weak family ties are conducive to the rise of public pension systems,
yet, if they emerge, pension systems are more generous in societies with strong family ties.
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2 The Basic Model
Consider an economy populated by cohorts of three-period lived overlapping generations that are
economically active for the last two periods of life. Label the periods of life as childhood, youth,
and old-age with childhood being economically passive. Let t D 1; 2; :::;1 denote time.
A young decision-maker (one born at date t   1/ at any date is endowed with w > 0 units of
a single, non-storable consumption good; she is endowed with y  0 units of the same good when
old. When young, she decides how many children, nt ; to raise at a contemporaneous cost of  per
child.8
To simplify the analysis, we assume there are no financial assets.9 Children, potentially, serve
two purposes in this economy. First, following the tradition of Becker and Barro (1988), Galor and
Weil (1996) and many others, the number of children provide direct utility to the parent. Second,
following the tradition of Cigno (1993), offspring may be considered akin to investment goods
insofar as they provide the means of a family pension system in which the parent, when young,
passes along a transfer t > 0 of goods to her parent in anticipation of receiving a possible transfer
tC1 > 0 from each of her children in the future.
A sequence ftg1tD1 represents a family pension system, or family constitution (Cigno, 1993) or
family compact (FC, hereafter), discussed in detail below. Let U t (defined in the section below)
denote the agent’s benchmark utility, i.e., what she can achieve on her own without participating in
the FC. Within a FC, however, a young agent at t faces a family-transfer obligation to transfer t
units of the good to her parents, with the understanding that she receives filial support from each
of her children – they will transfer tC1 units of the good to her (a total transfer of tC1nt ) at date
8The total number of people at each date t is Nt D N ct CN yt CN ot where N it is the size of the cohort i of the same age
at date t . Since Nt D
 
1C nt nt 1 C nt 1

N ot and NtC1 D
 
1C nt ntC1 C nt

N otC1 D
 
1C nt ntC1 C nt

nt 1 N ot ,
the gross population growth rate is NtC1Nt D
.1Cnt ntC1Cnt /nt 1
.1Cnt nt 1Cnt 1/ : In the steady state (or on a balanced growth path),
NtC1=Nt D n:
9If private saving was allowed, a lack of return dominance property – the saving instrument and the FC had to yield
the same rate of return – would obtain and this would influence the autarkic option. A consequence of disallowing a
private saving option is that fully-funded pension systems can no longer be studied within the confines of our setup.
That lacuna is not of great significance because, historically speaking, fully funded systems appeared long after family
compacts had been destroyed and pay-as-you-go pension systems were firmly in vogue. Cigno (2006 a) introduces a
savings instrument because of his interest in the effect of pensions on lifecycle saving.
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t C 1. Of course, the agent can choose to abide by the obligation or not; if she agrees to, she is,
in the language of Cigno (2006a), a “complier”, otherwise, she is a “go-it-aloner”. A FC is, then,
an entire sequence of such family-transfer obligations, one for each date. Clearly, for a FC to be
operative, it is necessary that each generation attains at least U t in utility under it.
The lifetime utility of a young decisionmaker at date t is
u .ct/C u .xt/C g .nt/
where ct .xt/ is the agent’s consumption when young (old), and 0 <   1 and   0 are
preference parameters. The functions u ./ and g ./ are increasing and concave; they also satisfy
u0 .0/ D 1; and g0 .0/ D M  1. It is important to note that the aforediscussed intergenerational
transfers are not based on altruism, since a parent’s well-being is not an argument of the young
agent’s utility function.10
At points below, we will consider a competing, publicly-funded pension system. Let . t ; bt 1/
summarize a pay-as-you-go public pension system (social security, hereafter SS), where  t is a
lump-sum tax collected at date t from a young agent and bt 1 is a contemporaneous transfer to each
old agent. Assuming the government balances its budget at each date, a sequence f t ; bt 1g1tD1 of
tax-transfers conforms to
N yt  t D N ot bt 1 H) nt 1 t D bt 1 (1)
for t  1: For now, we set aside the SS system and focus solely on a FC.
2.1 The agent’s problem
At date t , an agent in her youth chooses ct and nt , as well as a consumption plan, xt . The agent
also decides whether or not to participate in her FC. Given a .t ; tC1/ 2 <2CC; her problem is:
max u .ct/C u .xt/C g .nt/
10Since, by design, agents are not altruistic towards their children, they make no gifts or transfers to them. Cigno
(2006 a) additionally allows for gifts from parents to children. In his setup, an altruistic parent may choose to pass on
a generous gift to her children when they are young and accept a smaller transfer from them when they become adults.
The latter imperative may weaken the threat of generational autarky that keeps the FC alive and viable.
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subject to
c1 ct C t C nt  w
c2 xt  y C tC1nt
c3 ct  0I xt  0I nt  0:
When (c1) and (c2) bind, the choice variable satisfies:
u0 .w   t   nt/ D g0 .nt/C tC1u0 .y C tC1nt/ : (2)
Eq. (2) implicitly defines a solution, nt D n .t ItC1/ which, using (c1) and (c2), define indirect
utility .Ut/ the agent obtains under the FC.
As will be explained below, if the agent chooses not to abide by the FC, her choice of nt satisfies
u0 .w   nt/ D g0 .nt/ : (3)
Under this option – her outside option – she receives U t  u
 
w   nt
Cu .y/Cg  nt, where nt
satisfies (3). In this case, ct D w  nt and xt D y. If  D 0; then nt D 0 (because raising children
is costly) and the agent simply consumes his endowment. In that case, U t D U  u .w/C u .y/ :
The importance of assuming y > 0 is apparent here; since u0 .0/!1; allowing y D 0 precludes
non-existence of the FC simply because the outside option is so unappealing. Also note if  D 0;
no one has children outside of the FC and the economy ends.
We proceed to derive a family compact. The existence or non-existence of a FC relies solely on
the view that children are investment goods. Whether they are also viewed as consumption goods
is totally immaterial to the survial of a FC. To keep the discussion simple, until further notice, we
set  D 0:
2.2 The family compact
So far, we have loosely described a family compact as a sequence of transfers, ftg1tD1 ; whose
viability requires that, at each date, the utility obtained under it, Ut , is at least as great as that from
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the outside option, U t . This characterization is not entirely complete, since a family member at
any generation can take an action, call itbt ; that differs from t . As such, the compact must also
describe the actions of all current and future agents if such deviations do occur at some date. While
important, these represent the ‘fine print’ of the compact.11 Since they are secondary to our main
focus, we relegate them to an appendix.
We now turn to the notion of viability. When  D 0; a sequence ftg1tD1 of transfers is viable
(self-enforcing in the language of Cigno, 2006a) – the FC is subgame perfect – if
V .t ItC1/ D u .w   n .t ItC1/  t/C u .y C tC1n .t ItC1//  U ; (4)
holds for each date t , where n .t ItC1/ is, mutatis mutandis, the solution to (2). A family compact
is not unique. There may be a continuum of sequences ftg1tD1 that satisfy (4).
Needless to say, a FC must also ensure each generation procreates, i.e., n .t ItC1/ > 0 8t:
Let A denote the set of .t ; tC1/ consistent with n .t ItC1/  0: For each transfer t an agent is
asked to give to her parent, there is a minimum transfer min;tC1  0 she must anticipate receiving
before she is willing to have children, i.e., n  t Imin;tC1 D 0 for all t  0: The smallest of these
is defined implicitly by n .0Imin/ D 0: More generally, the locus of min;tC1 – call it the mapping
 .t/ – is increasing in t : Any feasible tC1 >  .t/ is consistent with procreation at date t .
Next, consider the function  .t/ : .0; w/  ! .min; w/ ; defined implicitly as V .t I .t// D
U , i.e., given t ;  ./ describes the size of the anticipated transfer from the young to old at t C 1
that leaves the young at t just as well off as the benchmark, U . It follows that V .0I .0// D
V .0Imin/ D U : The mapping  .t/   .t/ for all t  0: Figure 1 illustrates, with a
11A ‘private social security system’ requires trust; there must exist rewards and punishments for such a system of trust
to operate. Kandori (1992) and Salant (1991) have shown that in overlapping generations models there can be outcomes,
which support such cooperative arrangements even though the identity of players is changing over time.
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blue curve, a convex mapping  .t/ :12’13 Any transfer combination above the blue line generates
higher utility than the outside option.Let  () denote the smallest (largest) fixed point  D  ./
with  < w:
Proposition 1 Let 1 2 .0; ] be any initial transfer. A subgame perfect sequence of transfers
consistent with procreation,

t
	1
tD1, if it exists, satisfies i) tC1  
 
t
    t  and ii) t 2
.0; ] :
Henceforth, we restrict attention to sequences that satisfy the proposition.
Consider next, a stationary equilibrium, i.e., t D  > 0 for t  1. It is clear that stationary
equilibria belong to the set

; 

. These are shown as points along the yellow line in Figure 1.
12Why might  .t / be convex? Differentiating V .t I .t // D U and using the envelope theorem, we obtain
0 .t / D 1nt
u0.ct /
u0.xt / > 0; which, using (2) with  D 0; and nt D n
 
t ItC1

, yields 0 .t / D 1 tC1n.t ItC1/ : The
second derivative is
00 .t / D tC1
n2
"
1

 
1  tC1
n
@n
 
t ItC1

@tC1
!
  @n
 
t ItC1

@t
#
: (5)
The sign here is inconclusive; it is easy to show @n.t ItC1/@t < 0 but the sign of
@n.t ItC1/
@tC1 and the term including the
elasticity,

1  tC1n @n.t ItC1/@tC1

; are ambiguous. If the elasticity is negative or smaller than unity, 00 .t / > 0 over
the domain of t and the function  ./ is strictly convex.
13In drawing Figure 1, we have assumed, implicitly, 0 .0/ < 1 and lim
!w
0 ./ > 1; which are necessary (but not
sufficient) for the existence of fixed point of  ./ if the function is strictly convex. Also note, the mapping  ./ may not
exist - its existence rests critically on the utility function, the endowment profile, the per-child cost of raising children,
, and the discount factor . Loosely (and not surprisingly), a mapping exists when the old-age endowment .y/ is
sufficently small compared to w.
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Figure 1: The set of subgame perfect transfers.
Setting aside the welfare of the initial transfer recipients (the old at date t D 1), the best such
compact, is the one that maximizes the distance between the blue curve (no-compact alternative)
and yellow line (stationary compacts) – where 0 ./ D 1, and solves the following problem:
choose  to maximize
bV ./  u .w   n .I/  /C u .y C n .I// : (6)
Using the envelope theorem, and assuming an interior solution for , the first-order condition
reduces to
 u0 .w   n   /C nu0 .y C n/ D 0; (7)
which can be rewritten as u0 .c/ =u0 .x/ D n: Combine (7) with (2) above to get
n D 

: (8)
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In sum, the best stationary private subgame perfect compact is jointly given by (8) – the number of
children – and the size of the transfer, implicitly defined by
 u0 .w   2/C 

u0

y C 
2


D 0 (9)
following (7). In his specific context, Cigno (2006a) defines this set – (8) and (9) – to be the set
of “renegotiation-proof” family constitutions in a stationary setting. In the appendix, we work out
an example – with u .c/ D ln c and  D 0 – wherein we prove that the aforediscussed optimal,
stationary compact (consistent with procreation) exists.
It bears to emphasize the decision to abide by the FC or not is endogenous. Since there is no
heterogeneity among the children, they will all abide by the FC or none of them will. And, in the
steady state, if the parent has the incentive to pass along the transfer, the children will as well. By
construction – see (4) – there is no risk of default; either the FC is viable or it is not. Given the lack
of uncertainty in family transfers within a FC, there can be no efficiency-enhancing, insurance role
for public SS vis-a-vis the FC.
3 Pensions: Public and Private
Up to this point, we have discussed the workings of a family compact in a setting where children are
viewed solely as investment goods. In such a setting, there is no point to procreation – the economy
stops – in the absence of a family compact. This possibility is easily prevented by allowing parents
to, additionally, treat children as consumption goods. It also allows us to study a publicly-sponsored
pension system in which the youth of today pay taxes to support pensions for the current old.
3.1 Introducing a public pension
Consider an arbitrary, stationary, public pension system,  t D  ;8t satisfying (1). Assume such a
system is introduced alongside an existing, stationary, private family compact. The agent’s problem
is given by:
max u .ct/C u .xt/C g .nt/
12
subject to
ct C t C nt C   w
xt  y C tC1nt C b
ct  0I xt  0I nt  0:
Plugging the constraints into the objective function we get the following first order condition for n
in a stationary situation for given ;  and b:
u0 .w      n   / D g0 .n/C u0 .y C n C b/ :
The second order condition is given by D  2u00 C 2u00 C g00 < 0. It is easy to check that
@n
@
D  u
00
D
< 0: (10)
Incorporating the government budget constraint, b D n; the stationary interior analogs of (2) and
(7) are written as
u0 .w      n   / D g0 .n/C u0 .y C n C n/ ; (11)
and
u0 .w   n      / D nu0 .y C n C n/ : (12)
The stationary compact, ; must also satisfy u .w   n      /C u .y C n C n/C g .n/ 
u
 
w   n    Cu  y C n C g  n where n satisfies u0  w   n    D g0  n.14 Here
again, note if  D 0; no one has children outside of the FC and the economy ends; as such, if
 D 0; and FCs are not viable, a public SS system cannot emerge. In other words, if we are to
study the possible emergence of a public SS in a world where FCs have ceased to be viable, we
have to impose  > 0:
The question we explore in this section is, can introducing a stationary public system alongside
an existing, stationary, private family compact improve steady-state welfare? We find
14Once again, note that given u0 .0/ D 1; if y D 0 and  D 0; a viable stationary compact will always survive since
there is no other means to acquire the consumption good.
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Proposition 2 Introducing (or increasing the scope of) a public pension system along side a sta-
tionary private family compact cannot increase the welfare of agents in a steady state.
Proof. To see this, note the steady-state indirect utility of an agent under such a joint pension
system is given by
V . /  u .w   n . /   ./  /C u .y C  ./ n . /C n . //C g .n . // (13)
where the functions n . / and  ./ represent the solutions for n and  satisfy (11) and (12), for
given  :Differentiating (13), we can glean the effect on an agent’s welfare from a marginal increase
in  :
V 0 . / D u0 .c/   n0 . /  0 . /  1C u0 .x/  0 . / n . /C  ./ n0 . /C n . /C n0 . /
Cg0 .n . // n0 . / D n0 . / u0 .x/ I
(14)
here, in deriving the second equality in (14), we have used the envelope theorem – (11) and (12).
From (10), n0 . /  0 which proves V 0 . /  0:
Heuristically, a FC lines up the intertemporal tradeoff in a desirable way; there is nothing left for
the SS tax to ‘correct’. The underlying problem is that private agents view the public tax-transfer
scheme as lump sum and fail to internalize the budgetary implications of their fertility decision
(which the government takes as given). The government’s tax is seen only as an imposition with no
salient counterpart; moreover, they fail to understand the connection between the pension they are
promised and the number of kids they have. As such, the tax reduces available young-age income,
and as a result, agents reduce their fertility, i.e., n0 . /  0:
3.2 When do compacts break down?
The above proposition makes clear that a public pension system cannot offer agents anything more
than what they can achieve on their own through an optimally-selected family compact. Therefore,
a benevolent government has no welfare justification for introducing SS in a world with actively-
thriving family compacts. The upshot is that both a private family compact and a public SS system
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cannot coexist. That said, a natural question to ask is, when might such private compacts break
down?
A casual look at the changing nature of the public’s attitude toward private versus public pen-
sion systems suggests that a catalyst for change may be large and persistent shocks to income.
Indeed, social pension initiatives were enacted as part of larger, social welfare reforms during se-
vere economic declines (for example, Germany, 1880s and the United States, 1930s). Here, we
take up two parts of this argument. First, in Proposition 3, we show that within the context of the
model with no public pensions, an optimal stationary family compact may fail to obtain, precisely
because of low income .w/ when young:15 A way to think about this result, in a broader context,
is to envision a stationary equilibrium with a family compact in place. At some date, say, T , there
is a large, unexpected (and perceived permanent) decrease in w: At that point, the young at T are
unable to make good on the existing family compact – and, based on the perceived longevity of
the shock, a new family compact cannot be initiated. From that point onward, the economy would
revert to a no-compact benchmark world, until a future shock or change in government policy alters
the equilibrium. Second, given the inability to support a new stationary equilibrium with a family
compact, it is natural to inquire if an optimal stationary public pension system can be initiated to
replace the now-defunct private one. Unfortunately, the condition that ensures the non-existence of
a stationary family compact – low-enoughw – also precludes the existence of an optimal stationary
public system, as shown in Proposition 4.
Proposition 3 Assume a stationary family compact exists for a given endowment profile .w; y/.
Suppose there is an unexpected, permanent negative shock to w. If the shock is large enough: i)
the existing family compact will fall apart, and ii) a new stationary family compact, with a smaller,
positive transfer to the old, does not attain.
Proof. The original family compact is assumed to satisfy:
 u0 .w   n   /C nu0 .y C n/  0 (15)
15For simplicity, we assume no change in old-age endowment, y. Conditions for non-existence can be suitably
modified to incorporate changes in the entire income profile .w; y/.
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u0 .w   n   / D g0 .n/C u0 .y C n/ (16)
A stationary family compact will not attain, if, for every transfer  > 0, (15) holds with a
strict inequality for any n that satisfies (16). Given this, we begin by looking at the mappings
u0 .w   n/, = g0 .n/ - these are depicted as the upward (downward) sloped thick curves in Fig-
ure 2 - and the mapping nu0 .y/ ; the line emanating from the origin in Figure 2. At the point
n D n .0/ ; nu0 .y/ D = g0 .n/ : With n .0/ in hand, define Ow as the value of w such that
u0
  Ow   n .0/ D n .0/ u0 .y/ : Such a value for w exists, for any given n .0/, if u0 ./ satisfies
the usual limit conditions, i.e., lim
c!0
u0 ./ D 1; lim
c!1 u
0 ./ D 0: By construction, both (15) and (16)
hold with equality at n D n .0/ and w D Ow, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Eqns. (15) and (16)
To understand how a system of family compacts can break down entirely, suppose there is an
unexpected and permanent change in the first period endowment, wI specifically, holding y fixed,
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suppose the new first period endowment satisfies w  Ow. With w D Ow; any transfer  > 0
from young to old shifts the curves shown in Figure 2 in such a way that (15) holds with a strict
inequality, meaning the optimal compact is  D 0, since the cost of the transfer, in utility terms,
exceeds the benefit. These are shown in Figure 2 (the dotted curves show how the original curves
shift for any  > 0). Any endowment strictly less than Ow shifts the curve u0 .w   n   / further
up, ensuring no stationary compact exists.
We turn next to the public pension system. We enquire if an optimal stationary public pension
system can be initiated to replace the destroyed private compact. To that end, set  ./  0 in (14)
above; then, the optimal public pension satisfies
 u0 .c/C n . / u0 .x/C u0 .x/ n0 . /  0 (17)
where n satisfies
u0 .w   n   / D g0 .n/ : (18)
Note that in writing (18), we have used the fact that the future pension transfer is public, and
therefore, taken as given by the agent when deciding on fertility. In short, under a public system,
children are no longer investment goods.
Clearly, by construction, when w D Ow, the compact breaks down and hence, it follows from
(15)  u0 .c/C n . / u0 .x/ < 0: Since n0 . /  0; (17) holds with strict inequality for any  > 0
whenever w < Ow; similar to the case with private pensions, as shown in Figure 2. Therefore,
optimal  D 0: Formally,
Proposition 4 Suppose w  Ow. Then an optimal public pension system with  > 0 does not
attain.
Essentially, when w falls to Ow; a young agent can no longer make transfers to her parent and
have any remaining resources to consume and raise children of her own. At that point, the young
agent abandons the investment-utility benefit of the compact in favor of the direct consumption-
utility of having children.
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Summarizing, we have shown that a publicly-funded pension system does not provide addi-
tional support if an optimal private family compact is in place - indeed, introducing such a system
can even lower welfare in the steady state. While a family compact can perform well, it may break
down in the presence of large, permanent shocks to agents’ incomes. While this may seem to pro-
vide an ideal time for the introduction of a publicly-funded pension system, we find the conditions
that prevent families from starting a new, albeit less-generous family compact, also prevents an
optimal, steady-state public pension system from starting up.
3.3 Discussion
It deserves emphasis that our version of the optimal public pension problem takes per-capita steady
state lifetime utility as the objective function of the government. This choice is deliberate, and
made for two reasons. First, a public pension program that uses steady-state lifetime utility as its
objective function most closely mirrors the best of the family compacts, since the latter, devoid of
any altruistic ties across generations, ignores intergenerational trade-offs. Secondly – and perhaps
more fundamentally – a dynamic planning problem may not be well posed. To see this, imagine a
planner at the initial date that puts a ‘weight’ of  on the initial old generation and .1  / on the
weighted sum of the lifetime utility of all future generations, where each successive generation of
middle-age decisionmakers has a ‘weight’ of 0 < t 1 < 1; for t  1: The objective function for
such a planner is given by
 D N o1 u .x0/C .1  /
1X
tD0
t N ytC1VtC1 (19)
where Vt represents the lifetime utility of a middle-aged decision maker at date t . There is no
assurance, however, that the sum on the right hand side of (19) is finite, since the population
growth rate is endogenous and dependent on the choices of the planner; nor can the same be said
of the family compact equivalent to this sum, with which we’d like to make a comparison.16
16Specifically, there is no way to ensure n < 1 for any of the three alternatives (autarky, family compact, and the
public pension system).
18
As an alternative, one can conceive of an objective function made up of a weighted sum of per
capita utility across generations,
O D u .x0/C .1  /
1X
tD0
t VtC1 (20)
Since the allocations we study here are stationary, we have
Oi D u .x0/C .1  / V
i
1
1   (21)
where i indexes the alternative (autarky .a/, family compact . f /, or publicly funded SS .s/). Our
analysis in Section 3.1 is conducted for the special case of  D 0:17
Finally, a numerical example comparing the alternatives.
Example 1 Let g .a/ D u .a/ D a1 1  for a D c; x; n, and w D 10I y D 2I D 0:6I  D 1I  D 2
and  D 0:96 The consumption allocations c; x, number of children, n, family compact  or social
security tax  ; and steady-state per capita utility for autarky and optimal family compact and
publicly-funded SS systems are presented in Table 1.18
Alternative c n x   V O
Family Compact . f / 3.62 2.49 5.49 1.40 – 68.31 98.51
SS .s/ 4.40 2.14 4.82 – 1.32 68.27 98.46
Autarky .a/ 5.07 2.46 2 – – 68.02 97.87
As evident in this example, the population growth under an SS system is lower than under a
family compact or autarky. Fewer children and a lower intergenerational transfer ( versus ) allow
for greater consumption when young under the SS system. Of course, this comes at the expense
of lower consumption when old. The family compact, as noted, provides greater steady state per
capita utility.
17Setting  D 0 is also consistent with our focus exclusively on the pension performance of the two systems. When
 6D 0, the planner attaches some weight to the utility of those that do not contribute to the pension system (the initial
old) and hence places some value on the redistributive aspects of the program.
18The last column of Table 1 presents the value for Oi ; assuming the planner discounts the future in the same manner
as agents, i.e.,  D ; with  D 1=2:We also assume the size of the intital old generation is the same as that of the intial
young.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the workings of a family pension system, one where children provide
support for their elders in exchange for future pension care from their offspring. This system
resembles institutions in place prior to the emergence of support for the elderly through publicly
funded social security reforms in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Our results suggest that,
in the confines of the model we study, these family compacts work fairly well: they preclude the
introduction of publicly-funded pay-as-you-go social security. If one looks only at the pension
aspect of social security, to the total exclusion of its other vaunted benefits, one finds that private
family compacts did just as well on that front. Moreover, if a large income shock dislodged the
family compacts, no benevolent government would wish to set up a social security program in their
place. Our work suggests that the pension role of social security could not have been its raison
d’être.
At first blush, it may appear that one reason for the introduction of a public pension system,
apart from its redistributive role, may be a need for insurance. For example, there may be an ex-
ogenous family dissolution, say, due to migration, that leads to nullification of existing compacts.
The compact we have considered ignore such a possibility; however, since they satisfy subgame
perfection, there is no endogenous reason for default on the compacts. If young-age income uncer-
tainty is an issue, family compacts can easily be rewritten to accommodate this concern. The tenor
of our results, mutatis mutandis, would still be maintained.
One component not present in the current discussion is mortality. The possibility of a child’s
death before reaching adulthood creates additional cost for both a family compact and a government-
sponsored social security scheme. Within a family compact, this cost is internalized; one can treat
it analogous to a decrease in the return to children as an investment good. In a world in which old-
age security is provided solely through SS, and agents view children only as consumption goods,
the possibility that a child may die before reaching adulthood has no direct impact on agents’ fertil-
ity decisions; indirectly, however, it will affect the size of the available pool of young agents from
which to tap for contributions to the system, and, hence, the size of the SS transfer to each old
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agent. The mortality of agents from mid-age to old has much different ramifications. In a world
with only family compacts, the premature death of a parent frees her children from the obligation
of the transfer stipulated under the compact. In such a setting, those whose parents died early will
choose to have more children than those whose parents survived, thereby creating an endogenous
distribution of fertility. By contrast, under a pure SS system, there is no difference in fertility across
agents since fertility is no longer tied to a family transfer obligation. Moreover, the public system
can exploit the fact that some young agents will contribute into the program but not be around to
receive any benefits. Precisely how mortality figures into the comparison of these two systems is
an avenue for further study. And yet, it seems mortality is hardly the hook on which to establish
the continued primacy of SS systems.
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Appendix
A The compact’s fine print
Perhaps an efficient way to characterize this compact is to make the distinction between obligations,
t , actions,bt , and contingent obligationset , of which the latter can be thought of as a description
of how a child, in accordance with the compact, should respond to the actions of a parent. Define
a history of the family obligations as a list of the amount of obligatory donations up to the date t;
t  2 as H t  .1; 2; :::; t 1/ ; and likewise, for actions bH t and contingent obligations eH t :
We envision the matriarch of this family compact, the young decisionmaker at date 1, proposing
a sequence of family transfer obligations for all future generations ftg1tD2 , as well as a donational
transfer to her own parents, 1 > 0 at date 1. The compact also lays out how individuals should
act (contingent obligations fetg1tD2. Trivially, we set 1 Db1 De1.
At date 2, the young decisionmaker faces obligation 2 and contingent obligatione2, which, in
this case, since 1 Db1 De1,e2 is equal to 2. In other words, since her parent at date 1 selected
action b1 D e1, the minimum transfer she needs to make at date 2 to be in compliance with the
compact is the obligation 2.19 At this time, she chooses an actionb2 (this choice is described in
detail further below), which may or may not be in compliance with the compact.
The compact at this stage becomes more descriptive. The young decisionmaker at date 2 is
obliged to pass along a transfere2 D 2. At date 3, the parent’s child knows whether the parent’s
actionb2 lived up to the compact or not. Therefore, the contingent obligation facing this child, at
date 3, is
e3 D
8<: 3 ifb2 De20 otherwise : (22)
More generally, given H t ; eH t and bH t , for t  2, a contingent obligation facing a young agent at
date t consists of a transfer planet ;with
et D
8<: t ifbt 1 Det 10 otherwise : (23)
Since these contingent plans are defined recursively, it is useful to express them in terms of actions
and obligations, as well as updated one period:
19Technically, an agent can pass along a transferbt to her parent that is greater than her familial obligation t , but in
this model with no altruistic tie running from child to parent, there is no incentive for her to give any more than t . In
writing out the contingent obligationset below, it makes it easier
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etC1 D
8>>><>>>:
tC1 ifbt D t (A)
tC1 ifbt D 0 andbt 1 6Det 1 (B)
0 otherwise (C)
: (24)
Note that in this form, an offspring of a young decisionmaker at date t is obliged to follow the
compact provided her parent passes along a sufficient transfer to her parent at date t (A). The
compact also stipulates that the child, at t C 1; is obliged to pass on tC1 in the event that her
parent, in fulfilling her compact compact commitments, does not leave a transfer to her parent
(the child’s grandparent) at t in the event that the grandparent failed to carry out the contingent
obligation to her parent (the child’s great grandparent) at t   1 (B) Any transfer action bt not
meeting the conditions laid out in (A) or (B) of 24 constitutes a failure to live up to the compact at
date t and confirms onto the child the obligation to pass along a 0 transfer at t C 1:
The force of these contingency plans (and especially, B) ensures that if the child follows the
compact and punishes the parent for noncompliance of the compact at date t , the child will not face
a withholding of a transfer from her child at tC2. Another way to put this is that she is assured the
transfer tC2 > 0 even if she withholds a transfer from the wayward parent at t C 1 (and, by (C),
she is assured punishment at tC2 if she fails to punish her wayward parent at tC1). Together, these
contingency plans ensure the threat of punishment is credible - the parent’s child has the incentive
to mete out a punishment at date t C 1 if the parent fails to live up to her contingent obligation at
t - provided the compact obligations tC1; tC2 offer the child something better than what she can
do on her own (which we assume they do - see below). Any deviation by one generation simply
results in a response by the next that reverts back to the original compact plan.
B An example with logarithmic preferences
Let u .c/ D ln c and w > 2p.1C 2/ y: For this example, an interior solution for the number
of children, n, (2 above) satisfies

w   t   nt D
tC1
y C tC1nt
which implies a solution
n .t ItC1/ D tC1w   ttC1   y
tC1 .1C / : (25)
Here, min D y=w, and, for a given t , the set
n
tC1 : tC1  minww t
o
defines the set of permis-
sible future transfers that ensure n .t ItC1/  0: (For any tC1 not in this set, the solution to the
agent’s problem at date t is nt D 0):
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With t D tC1 D  for all t , n is increasing in ; for  < py= and decreasing thereafter.
The set of stationary compacts which ensure n .I/  0,
A D
n
 : 12

w  
p
w22   4y

<  < 12

w C
p
w22   4y
o
.
An agent’s utility under a compact is:
V .t ItC1/ D ln

w    tC1w   ttC1   y
tC1 .1C /   t

C  ln

y C tC1tC1w   ttC1   y
tC1 .1C /

D .1C / ln .tC1 .w   t/C y/  lntC1 C C;
where C   ln   .1C / ln .1C /   ln , is a constant. The expression for lifetime utility,
V .t ItC1/, is valid for all pairs .t ItC1/, t ; tC1  w; with n .t ItC1/  0: In particular,
when t D tC1 D ; V ./ is defined for all  2 A. (Note that in this case, the expression,
w   n .I/   ; which represents first period consumption, equals .w 2Cy/
.1C/ ; this term is
positive for all compacts 0 <  < w). We have
V ./ D .1C / ln  w C y   2  ln C C: (26)
The limit of lifetime utility V ./ as  approaches the lower bound of A, A is ln
 
w   A
C ln y,
and at its upper bound, A, is ln .w   A/C ln y; both are less than the benchmark (no-compact)
alternative lnw C  ln y. As we indicated above, the set A0 of transfers that equal or beat the
benchmark alternative is contained in A.
For a given t ; the mapping  .t/ is defined implicitly in the following manner:
.1C / ln . .t/ .w   t/C y/  ln .t/C C D lnw C  ln y;
and the points  and  satisfy
.1C / ln    w   C y  ln C C D lnw C  ln y
.1C / ln . .w   /C y/  ln C C D lnw C  ln y:
The set of stationary compacts A0   :     	 :
Above, we showed that the optimal stationary compact satisfies the condition, n D 

. Using
the expression n .I/, we can solve directly for :20
 D w 
p
w22   4y   8 y
4 C 2 : (27)
Call these two roots   and C: The assumption w > 2
p
.1C 2/ y ensures the solutions (27)
are real valued.
20Of course, alternatively, we can compute the optimal compact by differentiating lifetime utility V ./ (26)with
respect to :
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How can we be assured that lifetime utility V ./ under one of these solutions exceeds the
benchmark u .w/C u .y/? First, note that
V 0 ./ D   y C 
2 C 22   w
 . .w   /C y/
which is negative for low , and, in particular, for  <  : Second, we note that at the boundaries
of the set of permissible stationary compacts with n  0, we have V .A/ < V
 
A

< u .w/ C
u .y/ : Finally, we show A <   < C < A :
A   C D 12

w C
q
w22   4y

  w C
p
w22   4y   8 y
4 C 2
D 1
2 .2 C 1/

w   
q
w22   8y   4y C 2
q
w22   4y C w2 C
q
w22   4y

> 0;
since w   
p
w22   8y   4y > w   
p
w22 D w .1  / > 0:
Similarly,
    A D
w  
p
w22   4y   8 y
4 C 2  
1
2

w  
q
w22   4y

D 1
2 .2 C 1/

.2 C 1/
q
w22   4y   
q
w22   8y   4y   w .1C /

This latter expression is decreasing in y: Using the assumption w > 2
p
.1C 2/ y ) .w/24.1C2/ >
y; we evaluate at y D .w/24.1C2/ :
    A >
w
2 .2 C 1/
 
.2 C 1/
s
1C 
2 C 1   .1C /
!
D w
2 .2 C 1/
p
2 C 1p1C    .1C /
>
w
2 .2 C 1/
p
1C p1C    .1C / D 0
The stationary compact and the optimal compact, C are depicted below in the figure below:
25
aLifetime
Utility
u(w) +bu(y)
aA a _ a a+ a  aA
Set of valid
stationary compacts
 _
_ _
V(a)
 _
Figure 3: Lifetime utility V ./ and the no-compact benchmark:
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